Introduction
Models of protection in computer systems usually possess two components: a finite, labeled, directed two color graph representing the protection state of an operating system and a finite set of graph transformation rules with which the protection state may be changed.
Harrison, Ruzzo and Ullman demonstrated [1] that the safety problem for a very general protection model is undecidable, i.e., no algorithm could decide, given a protection graph and a set of transformation rules, whether an edge with a particular label is ever added to the graph. The Take-Grant Model [2, 3, 4] has been developed in response to this negative result in order to study such questions for a particuZar set of transition rules. Linear-time algorithms to test safety-like problems have been found [2, 3] for the Take-Grant transition rules. Although the model is simple enough to permit linear time decision procedures, it is rich enough to implement many sharing relationships [4] . Here we concentrate on the formal development supporting the motivational and interpretive treatments given in [4, 5] .
First, we characterize the class of graphs that can be created with the Take-Grant rules. Next, the can·steaL predicate, first introduced in a limited form [41, is developed in full generality making it applicable to the common situation of "stealing files."
Another main topic is that of quantifying the amount of "cooperation" required to share or steal rights. By the amount of "cooperation" we mean the number of users (i.e., subject vertices in the model) required toinitiate rules in order for a particular edge to be added to a graph. This concept has been called "conspiracy" in (2) . Exact conspiracy measurements -2- for arbitrary protection graphs are derived and an algorithm for discovering minimum conspiracy is presented.
The. Take-Grant Model,
The definitions for the Take-Grant model follow earlier treatments [2, 3, 4 ] differing in only inessential ways.* Fix a finite alphabet of labels R = {r1, ••• ,rm}U{t,g} called rights containing two distinguished elements; lit" is mnemonic for "take" and "g" is mnemonic for "grant." A protection graph is a finite, directed, loop-free, two color graph with edges labeled by nonempty subsets of R. Four rewriting rules~re defined to enable a protection graph to change:
Take: Let x, y, and z be distinct vertices in a protection graph G such that x is a sUbject. Let there be an edge from x to y labeled y such that "t" E Y, an edge from y to z labeled a and a~6. Then the take rule defines a new gr~ph G' by adding an edge to the protection graph from x to z labeled Q. Graphically,
The rule can be read: "x takes (0 to z) from y."
Grant: Let x, y, and z be distinct vertices in a protection graph G such that x is a subject. Let there be an edge from x to y labeled y such that "g" E y, an edge from x to z labeled S, and a~a. The grant rule defines a new graph G' by adding an edge from y to z labeled Q. Graphically,
The rule can be read: "x grants (a to z) to y." *Specifically, the "call" rule of [2J has been dropped, r and w labels (used in [2J), are replaced by t and g, respectively, and "inert" rights [5,6J are permitted.
-3-Create: Let x be any subject vertex in a protection graph G and let a be a nonernpty subset of R. Create defines a new graph G' by adding a new vertex n to the graph and an edge from x to n labeled a. Graphically,
The rule can be read: " X creates (0 to)
Remove: Let x and y be any distinct vertices in a protection graph G such that x is a subject. Let there be an edge from x to y labeled S, and let a be any subset of rights.
Then remove defines a new graph G' by deleting the a labels from.B.
If a becomes empty as a result, the edge itself is deleted. Graphically,
The rule can be read: "x removes (0 to) y."
In these rules, x is called the initiator. additional concepts to be introduced, the development thus far is adequate for proving a characterization result.
Take-Grant Definabl.e Graphs
It has been argued [4] that the protection graphs actually used in an operating system will be generated by a fixed set of rule-protocols, e.g., by the operating system supervisor, editors ( compliers, etc.
Hence, it is important to know what class of graphs can be generated by *Dashed lines are used in illustrations as a visual aid. Also, even though there is only one directed edge from any vertex a to any vertex h, we occasionally draw two to emphasize changes in labelling. Remove. operation must be charged to each component but one to perform the disconnection. Together, these give 2(k-l). since the edge that was created as an artificat of creating one of vertices of the conponent was then removed when separating the components, there has not been an aCCQunting for any of the edges of G. These can be added to the graph at the rate of one per rule application, giving the lower bound.
To see the upper limit note that rules (3.1) and (3.3) are sufficient to form one vertex in each component. For each edge charge. one application of (3.1) to create its target vertex, one application of (3.2) to assign the edge to the source, and, possibly, one application of (3.3) to delete the edge from v.
Clearly, the bounds are both achievable as the example in Figure 2 illustrates. 
Predicates and earlier results
Several properties of paths will be extremely important in our later development. A sequence of vertices x " " , X is a path in G if o . n ent of di~ectionality. q and the label n on the edge between x. and , An island of G is a maximal, tg-connected subject-
++++
The edge alphabet is composed of four letters {t,9,t,9}' If • ""
• has the words ttg and tgg it.
A path x O ,·,· IX n is an initial span i f it has an associated word in
span if n>O and it has an associated word in {t }, and it is a bridge if (a) n>l and x and x are subjects, (b) an associated, o n +* +* -+*-t+* +*+-+-* word is in {t , t , t gt , t gt }, and (c) the x, are objects (O<i<n). Note , that the initial and terminal spans have an orientation, i.e., X o is the source of the spans. We say x o initially or terminally spans to x n "
In order to share information in the protection system, an edge pointing from the recipient to the information being shared must be added to the protection graph by means of a sequence of rule transformations of the graph. Accordingly, we may define for a set of rights a and distinct vertices p and q of .a protection graph GO' the predicatẽ there are protection graphs G , ... ,G As corollaries, it is known that there are algorithms operating in linear time in the size (V+E) of the graph to test both predicates.
Theft
The can'share predicate presumes perfect cooperation from all users (i.e., subjects 
Clearly, p, q and s must be distinct since these are protection graphs.
Although a motivational discussion of can·steat appears elsewhere
[4], a few additional remarks are in order. Notice that can'steaL(o,p,q,G)
does not hold when p already "owns"~rights to q. This is more realistic although it is somewhat inconvenient, technically. Also an "owner" s of a right a cannot grant the right away since to do so and to claim later that a theft occurred would strain credibility. But s can participate in a theft in other ways. In particular for the protection graph of Figure 3 , s would be involved in any theft of a rights to q, because it must grant (t to r) to p. It is reasonable for the definition to allow this since s could be duped into participating, but alternate definitions, e.g. where right owners are required to be completely inactive, is also reasonable.
Thus, the present definition analyzes thefts where the only limit to full . cooperation of all users is that "owners" cannot grant their rights away. ',---
Subject s~articipatas in a theft. To see that the remainder of that condition is satisfied, let G be a minimal length derivation sequence and let n i be the least index such that G. lb-
That is, G. is the first graph where an a labeled edge to q is added. 
Conspiracy
In this section we are concerned with the amount of "cooperation" required to effect the sharing or stealing. This cooperation has been called "conspiracy" [2] and for a given sequence of legal rule applications Pl' .... 'Pn it is simply I{xlx initiates Pill. Our concern in this section is determining for a given true predicate aanoshare(a,p,q,Go) the minimum conspiracy required to produce a G that is a witness to its truth. We n will be able~o find the exact value for arbitrary protection graphs.
(Conspiracy has been studied [6J and a lower bound has been established.
The bound is based on edge incidence and is not ti~ht. For example, the class of graphs of the form shown in Figure 4 require n+2 conspirators for P to acquire the a edge to q, but the previous lower bound for these graphs is O. The present formulation uses the more flexible notion of "spans" to assess protection graphs.)
Let G be a protection graph and y a subject vertex, then the
access-set with focus Y
A(y) = def {y} U {xly initially spans or terminally spans to x}.
Clearly, for a given focus y in G, A(y) is unique. Access sets will be used to measure the size of the conspiracy.
For the remainder of the section, we restrict our attention to a protection graph G with distinct vertices p~xO"·,,x n = s, x n + l q.
An edge in G either forms a direct tg-connection between x. 1 and x 'l~i_<n) or J. Claim: Every vertex x. that is a tg-sink must be an initiator. (i+k = u) constitute a cover for GO' The theorem follows.
Some discussion is in order. Basically, edges can be .transmitted by an initiator to any vertex in its access set. Edges are passed "along the path" because access sets will overlap. If one initiator can take from the common element and the other can grant to it, then edges can move from one access set to the next. But if the common vertex is a tg-sink, then it must aid in the communication.
Next we establish a matching upper bound, but first a lemma will simplify matters. common element, A{y.) n A(y. ,1.
1+
Proof: Let z "" A(y.) n A(y. ,1. II.
.. Let can-shaPe (a,p,q,G) hold via the tg-connected path GO' (p = xO,.,.,x n = s) and let A(yl), .
III. initial( t g) terminal (t ) la)
•. ,A(y k ) be a minimal access-set cover for GO. Let.9. be the number of tg-sinks. 
Conspiracy in generaZ graphs
Although the theorems of the last section give an exact measurement of the number of initiators required for sharing, they only apply to paths. path from p to s does not qualify as a legal path for canoshare(a,p,q,G)
to hold, even though the predicate is true. working from the development of section 6 we now present a finer analysis applicable to general graphs.
Recall that if vE A(xl, the access set with focus x, there are three possible conditions any subset of which v can satisfy: v is the focus of A(xl (i.e., v = x), x initially spans to v or x te~nally spans to v.
Each of these properties is said to be a reason for v E A(x).
Given a protection graph G with subject vertices xl, .
•. ,x n ' we will But this implies (if r is an object) that there is no bridge between zi_l and zi+l (contradicting by Lemma 7.1 the assumption that the zl,.··,zi_l,zi+l,···,zn are sufficient) or it implies (if r is a subject) the presence of a tg-sink.
By Theorem 6.1 r must be counted as a conspirator.
Concluding Remarks o
The development of the conspiracy results provides a reasonably clear picture of how sharing is accomplished in the Take-Grant Model. In particular, the notion of access-set describes that portion of a protection graph under direct "control" of the subject which is its focus. Communication outside of this region of influence requires the cooperation of other subjects.
This information will doubtless be useful for designers of specific protection systems as previously explained [4].
Several problems remain open. First, there is the question of algorithmic complexity of determining the minimum number of conspirators required for a right to be shared. In Section 7 this is determined by finding a shortest path in a conspiracy graph. That question is obviously a linear time process, but the construction of a conspiracy graph (as described) requires n 2 operations for an n subject graph just to fill in the edges. A simpler scheme that does not depend on the explicit construction of the conspiracy graph could be envisaged.
Another issue is to determine for a given graph what set of conspirators.
must have participated in the sharing of a right after the fact. The test is complicated by the fact that certain rights could have been removed in order
